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I. INTRODUCTION

In its early stages, the case of RTE, ITP and BBC v. Magill Publications'
appeared to be a confrontation of David and Goliath proportions on the
battlefield of the licensing of copyrighted television listings. However, the
case has since come to represent a significant issue of European Community
competition law, one that attempts to balance concern over industrial and
commercial property rights defined under national law against the Community's interests in creating a system of undistorted competition.2 A variety of
interested parties have followed the case as it has proceeded from one
judicial level to the next. Scholars on the evolution of European Community
law have watched to see how the courts would balance competition law with
national laws on intellectual property rights.3 Practitioners in the field of
intellectual property have watched to see how far the courts would go in
forcing dominant owners of intellectual property rights to make their
products available to emerging players.4 However, the result of the case
may be so specific to its own facts and circumstances that, in the end, the
case provides much more in the way of speculation than concrete guidance.

* J.D. 1996. The author would like to thank her family for their love and support and
Marian House McDonald for her assistance and encouragement.
Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission (1
June 1994), Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P.
2 Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P,
Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission (1 June
1994), para. 1 [hereinafter Gulmann Opinion].
3 European Court Says Competition Trumps Copyright, INFORMATION LAW ALERT: A
VOORHEES REPORT,

File.
4 id.
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II. EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrY BACKGROUND

The European Community (EC) was established by the Treaty of Rome
(EC Treaty) in 1957 in an effort by its individual member states to form a
common market to promote the "harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the
States belonging to it."5 EC competition law is based on the premise that
coordinated action in the international market could lead to a competitive
advantage over individual action.6 In particular, the removal of trade
barriers within the Community provides the advantages of greater efficiency
through specialization based on comparative national advantage and
increased competition.! To maintain this free and open economic system,
the EC Treaty establishes guidelines for fair competition and for the
balancing of national and Community law on competition issues. In this
manner, the Treaty seeks to establish a cooperative trading environment to
concentrate the focus of member states on the development of Community
rather than national markets.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that where national laws
conflict with Community laws, Community laws take precedence.'
However, in some areas potential conflicts have not specifically been
provided for in the EC Treaty. The Treaty does not provide for specific
regulations on the law of intellectual property or for how this area might
conflict with competition laws. 9 Laws on issues such as copyright have
been left to the government of each Member State to develop and enforce.10
Instead of developing intellectual property laws of its own, the EC has
focused on how the interaction of the laws of Member States affects the
competition principles enumerated in the EC Treaty.' The difficulty lies

5 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMuNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) art. 2 [hereinafter EC TREATY).
6Lynne Kimberly Law, NationalCopyright Law v. Community Law: Which is Controlling
in Intellectual PropertyDerivative Market Products?, 10 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 333 (1992).
7 Id. at 346.
8Jan Corbet, The Law of the EEC and Intellectual Property, 13 J.L. & COM. 327, at 330
(citing Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 585, 3
C.M.L.R.425 (1964)).
9 Law, supra note 6, at 333.
'0 Id. at 333.
" Id. at 342.
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in the inherently exclusive nature of the intellectual property right, which
directly conflicts with the Community's goal of eliminating restrictions on
trade.
Article 222 of the EC Treaty states that the Treaty provisions "shall in no
way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property
ownership."12 Under this rationale, it seems that the holder of an intellectual property right would be in a position to frustrate the Community's goals
of preventing trade restrictions. 3 The Advocate-General has interpreted
this Article to mean that the existence of basic intellectual property rights
cannot be challenged. 4 The Court of Justice has dealt with this difficult
matter in the past by distinguishing between the existence of an intellectual
property right and the exercise of that right, finding that while the existence
of the right may not be challenged, the exercise of that right may be
restricted if it violates provisions of the EC Treaty.' 5 The Court has also
applied a "subject matter" test, which provides that the protection of national
intellectual property laws cannot extend beyond the bounds of the core
subject matter, as distinguished from a fringe characteristic, of a given
6
intellectual property right.'
The courts of the Community indirectly control intellectual property rights
such as copyright by ensuring that the exercise of these rights by their owner
does not violate the restrictions set forth in Articles 36, 85 and 86."
Article 36 provides that protective copyright laws will remain unaffected by

12EC TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 222.
13Ronald E. Myrick, Influences Affecting the Licensing of Rights in a Unitary European
Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 81, 97 (1993).
,4Id. at 100 (citing Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer, Parke, Davis, 1968 E.C.R at
77, 7 C.M.L.R. at 48).
15Id. at 101 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazuetischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, 3 C.L.M.R. 217); Andreas Reindl, The
Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 INT'L. REv. INDUs.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 60, 65-7, (1993).
16 The specific subject matter of a right is determined by "an assessment of what is
necessary to fulfill the essential function of the intellectual property right in question."
Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2 para. 85. As to copyrights, the ECJ has held that the
exclusive rights of performance and reproduction as well as exclusive lending rights are
among its core subject matter. Reindl, supra note 15, at 66-68 (citing Case 158/86, Warner
Brothers v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605, 3 C.M.L.R. 684 (1990)); Myrick, supra note 13,
at 103 (citing Case 1574, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E.C.R. at 1162, 2 C.M.L.R. at
503).
17 Law, supra note 6, at 333.
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other provisions in the Treaty as long as they do not constitute "arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.""8
Article 85 prohibits agreements which effectively restrict, distort or prevent
competition among the Member States.19 Article 86 prohibits the abuse of
a dominant position to the extent that it has the potential to affect trade
2
within the Community. 0
HI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The tension between national copyright law and the pro-competition
policies of the European Community is exemplified by the 1986 case
involving, on the one hand, Magill Publications, an Irish publishing
company, and, on the other hand, the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) and Radio Telefis
Eireann (RTE).21 The case involved a conflict over the publication of
program listings protected by copyrights held by the broadcasters under the
national copyright laws of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.
RTE enjoys a statutory monopoly in Ireland for the provision of culturallyoriented television and radio service. 22 The BBC and ITP share a duopoly
within the United Kingdom for the provision of television services. 23 Most
of the homes in Ireland and approximately 30-40% of the homes in Northern

'sEC TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 36.

19EC TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 85(1). "The following shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market ...." Id.
20 Id at art. 86. "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States." Id. A dominant
position can be defined as a "position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by
allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and customers
and ultimately of consumers." Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2 para. 177.
21 Copyrights, Official Says Landmark EU Competition Ruling Should
Be Overturned,
BNA DAiLY REPORT FOR ExEcuTivEs, Section A, 109, at 2, available in LEXIS, Legnew
Library, Allnws File [hereinafter BNA Report].
" David Perkins, Foreign Principles of Intellectual Property/Antitrust: the EEC, 339
PLI/PAT 279, 294 (1992).
23Id. at 294.
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Ireland receive the six television channels provided by these three broadcasters.U Some additional channels are available through satellite transmissions. At the time of the case, there was no comprehensive TV guide
available in either the U.K. or in the Republic of Ireland because of similar
licensing policies by the three broadcasters restricting the dissemination of
program listings.75 At the time, each of the broadcasters produced its own
weekly guide containing its program listings as well as program descriptions,
all of which the broadcasters asserted was protected as copyrighted material
under the U.K. Copyright Act of 1956 or the Irish Copyright Act of 1963.'
The broadcasters provided weekly schedules to newspapers free of charge
under a license which provided that the listings could only be published 1-2
days in advance of their broadcast and subject to certain qualitative
restrictions to ensure the moral rights of the listing's content.27
Magill TV Guide Ltd. was established in Ireland with the express purpose
of publishing a comprehensive TV guide containing the information under
the disputed copyright protection.28 In May 1986, Magill published
complete listings for channels that could be received in Ireland using listings
identical to those distributed by the broadcasters except for commentary
related to Magill's own publication.29 All three broadcasters demanded
Magill at that time to discontinue its publication of the listings in violation
of the licensing agreement, stating that the listings were protected under
authors' rights.30 When Magill resumed publication of the comprehensive
weekly, the broadcasters sought an injunction in the Irish courts to prevent
Magill from continuing to publish, claiming that as literary works and

4

Id. at 294.

Id. at 294.
26 Id. at 294. The BBC's listings are published in Radio Times, ITP publishes the listings
for both ITV and Channel 4 in the TV Times and RTE publishes its radio and TV listings in
the RTE Guide. Id. at 295.
'Moral rights' is a European concept allowing authors to prevent any
27 Id. at 295.
alterations of their work that might damage their reputation. Junda Woo, European Court is
Advised to Overturn Antitrust Ruling, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at B9.
28 Perkins, supra note 22, at 295.
29 Radio Telefis Eireann, British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Enterprises Ltd and
Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Magill TV Guide Ltd, Richview Browne & Nolan
Ltd, Newspread Ltd and Vincent Browne, [1989] IR 554, [1990] IRLM 534, 538 [hereinafter
Irish High Court].
30 EU: Court of Justice - Advocate General Invites Court to Annul Judgment of TV
Programme PublicationRuling, AGENCE EUROPE, June 3, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
25

INT-NEWS-C.
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compilations, the schedules were entitled to national copyright protection. 31
Magill opposed the broadcasters' copyright claim and counterclaimed that the
broadcasters violated Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty by refusing to
allow it to publish the listings on fair and reasonable terms. 2
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Irish High Court
The Irish High Court found that the listings at issue constituted original
literary work as defined by the Irish Copyright Act of 1963." Such work
is not confined to literary art but encompasses any printed or written
composition, including tables and compilations.'
Only the expression in
writing need be original, not necessarily the ideas expressed.35 The Court
held that as long as the compilation involved the author's skill, labor and
time, the author was entitled to the protection of the copyright.3 6
As to Magill's Article 85 complaint, 7 the Court found that Article 85
would apply only where the broadcasters had engaged in a concerted practice
which had the potential to affect Member State trade and had the objective
or effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition within the
common market.3 8 To establish the existence of a concerted practice,
Magill would have to prove some coordination between the undertakings of
the broadcasters which, though falling short of an agreement, "knowingly
substitutes practical cooperation for the risks of competition. ''39 The Court
found that Magill had not established concerted action among BBC, RTE
and ITP in the application of their licensing policies, and that any resulting
restriction of competition had only a minimal effect on trade between

31Perkins, supra note 22, at 295. Copyrights in compilations involving no original or
artistic creativity are only recognized under the national copyright laws of the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands. Id. at 296.
32 Irish High Court, (1990) ILRM at 534.
33Id. at 534.
34

id.

35id.
36Id.

at 534-35.

37See generally, EC TREATY, supra note 19, at art. 85.
38 Irish

39Id.

High Court (1990) ILRM at 535.
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Member States.40
As to the Article 86 claim,41 the Court found that the broadcasters'
refusal to allow Magill to publish program information beyond that provided
in the conditioned license was merely an exercise of the commercial
advantage granted to them by their Irish copyright.42 On April 4, 1986, in
contemplation of its publication of a comprehensive TV Guide and prior to
the injunction complaint in the Irish court system, Magill had lodged a
complaint against the three broadcasters with the European Commission
alleging an abuse of dominant position under Article 86 for the refusal to
grant Magill a license to publish the listings. 3 Consequently, the Irish
High Court limited its consideration to finding facts relevant to the Article
86 claim regarding the potential existence and abuse of a dominant position
by the broadcasters.' The Court withheld determination on these claims
because of the pendency of the broadcasters' appeal from the Commission
decision.45
B. European Commission
In its consideration of the Magill case, the European Commission defined
the relevant product market as advance weekly listings and comprehensive
weekly TV guides for both radio and television and the relevant market as
both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.4 In its examination of
the Article 86 claim of abuse of dominant position, the Commission
characterized a dominant position as one which stifles competition and
cultivates economic dependence in downstream users of a product.47 The

40 I.
The Member States alleged to have been affected were Ireland and the United
Kingdom because of the publication's potential sales in Northern Ireland.
41 See generally, EC TREATY, supra note 20, at art. 86.

42 Irish High Court (1990) ILRM at 535.
41 Perkins, supra note 22, at 295. Magill's complaint was lodged under European Council
Regulation No. 17 which implements Articles 85 & 86 of the EEC Treaty. Id. at 295.
4Irish
High Court, (1990) ILRM at 547-48.
45id.
"Commission Decision 89/205 EC of 21 December 1988, relating to a proceeding under
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1989 O.J. (L78) at 48 [hereinafter Commission Decision]. It
has been asserted that by so defining the relevant product market, the Commission is focusing
first on the abuse and then tailoring the market to reflect the policy considerations thereby
implicated. Reindl, supra note 15, at 62 n. 11.
4 Commission Decision, 1989 O.J. (L78) at 48.
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Commission found that the broadcasters held a legal monopoly by virtue of
their copyright for the listings, as well as a factual monopoly by virtue of the
fact that, as producers of the raw materials essential to the production of any
weekly guide (namely the listings themselves), they controlled the market for
those listings." On the basis of the legal and factual monopolies and the
creation of economic dependence on the broadcasters by publishers like
Magill, the Commission found that the broadcasters held a dominant position
in the market for advance weekly listings.49
In deciding whether or not the broadcasters' exercise of their copyright
licenses constituted an abuse of their dominant position, the Commission
considered the potential demand for a comprehensive TV guide within the
relevant market.' The Commission determined that the potential demand
was substantial based on the sales of Magill's previously offered comprehensive weekly TV publication and the popularity of such publications in other
Member States."l In response to the broadcasters' argument that control
over their listings was necessary to preserve comprehensive and high quality
treatment of all of its offerings, the Commission found that less restrictive
quality control methods were available, noting that the broadcasters did not
demand such high standards from the already authorized dally publication of
their listings. 2 On this basis, the Commission found that the licensing
restrictions were designed more for the protection of the broadcasters'
position in the market for weekly guides than for quality control.5 3 As
such, they constituted a restriction to the prejudice of consumers by
preventing a new product with substantial potential demand from entering the
market.'
The Commission considered the subject matter of the copyright held by
the broadcasters to be limited to advance weekly listings. 5 5 The Commission determined that the market for weekly TV guides was a derivative
market and that in retaining dominance within that market, the broadcasters

48 Id. at 48-49.
49
50

Id. at 49.
Id. at 49.

51 Id.
52

Id. at 49-50.
ld&at 50.

Id. at 50. Article 86(b) provides that, "limiting production, markets or technical
development to the prejudice of consumers" constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. EC
TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 86(b).
s Commission Decision, 1989 O.J. (L78) at 48.
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were using their copyrights to obtain benefits beyond the specific subject
matter of their intellectual property right.56
In order to constitute a violation of Article 86, the abuse must affect trade
between Member States." The Commission found that because the weekly
TV guide would be offered for sale in both Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland, trade between Member States would be detrimentally
Having found all of the required elements for abuse of a
affected.
dominant position, the Commission held that the broadcasters' licensing
restrictions were an infringement of Article 86."
The Commission has the power to stop an infringement of Article 86
As a result of the decision, the
when it determines that one exists.'
broadcasters were required to provide their individual advance weekly
program listings to each other and any third parties requesting them on a
non-discriminatory basis, and to permit reproduction of these listings.6 '
The Commission recognized that royalties and any licenses the broadcasters
felt necessary to exact in order to maintain high quality and comprehensive
program coverage would be reasonable.62 The broadcasters appealed the
decision of the Commission under Article 173 and were granted an interim
suspension of the mandated licensing by the acting President of the Court of
Justice.6 3

56 Id. at 50.

EC TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 86.
5 Commission Decision, 1989 O.J. (L78) at 50.
57

5Id. at 51.
6o Council Regulation No. 17 implementing Articles 85 and 86, art. 3, 1959-1962 O.J.
SPEC. ED. 87. "Where the Commission, upon application or upon its own initiative, finds that
there is infringement of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by design require the
undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end."
Id.
61 Commission Decision, 1989 O.J. (L78) at 50.
62 Id. at 50-51.
3 Case T-76/89, Independent Television Publications Limited v. Commission (Magill TV
Guide Intervening), 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, 4 C.M.L.R. 745, para. 12 (Ct. First Instance 1991)
[hereinafter Court of First Instance]; Case T-70/89, The British Broadcasting Corp. & BBC
Enterprises Ltd. v. Commission (Magill TV Guide Intervening), 1991 E.C.R. H-535, 4
C.M.L.R 669 (Ct. First Instance 1991); Case T-69-89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission
(Magill TV Guide Intervening), 1991 E.C.R. 11-485, 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance 1991).
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C. The Court of FirstInstance
All cases related to competition are heard first in the Court of First
Instance (CFI), whose decisions are then appealable in the ECJ.' This case
was heard by the Court of First Instance (CFI)in July 1991 with Magill
intervening in favor of the Commission decision.65 The broadcasters
asserted that the relevant market was not the weekly listings but instead was
the general market for information on television programs, and that because
a large proportion of viewers got their information from sources other than
the broadcasters' own publications, such as the 1-2 day listings, their position
in the market was not dominant.' The CFI rejected this view, stating that
the daily listings could not be substituted for the comprehensive weekly
guide, and agreed with the Commission that the relevant market should be
that of weekly program listings and weekly television publications.67 The
CFI held that the broadcasters were dominant in both of those markets, since
they monopolized the information itself and therefore any potential
competitors were economically dependent on the broadcasters for the supply
of the listings information."
The CFI acknowledged that under the Court of Justice ruling in Keurkoop
v. Nancy Kean Gifts,69 when the Community has not standardized or
harmonized national rules, the procedures and conditions under which
copyrights are protected are governed by national rules.7" However, the
CFI stressed the need to maintain a balance between national copyright rules
granting the right to control creative property and Community rules designed
to maintain freedom of competition between the Member States.
Article 36 of the EC Treaty provides a conditional exception for
intellectual property from the Community's stringent rules relating to the free
movement of goods.71 The CFI interpreted this exception "in the light of

" Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C244), 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992),
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty] at art 168a; Myrick, supra note 13, at 88.
6 Court of First Instance, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, para. 12.
"Id. para. 15, 16.
67 Id. para. 47.
6Id. para. 49.
69Case 144/81, Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts, 1982 E.C.R. 2853, 2 C.M.L.R. 47 (1982).
70 Court of FirstInstance, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, para. 51.
71Id. para. 52.
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the Community's objectives and activities as defined by Articles 2 and 3 of
the EEC Treaty" to allow intellectual property rights to be protected from
Community restrictions only insofar as they are "inherent in the protection
of the actual substance of the intellectual property right. ' 7 2 As stated
earlier, the ECJ has narrowly defined the subject matter of an intellectual
property right as consisting of a "core bundle" of rights distinguishable from
any peripheral rights which might constitute merely a fringe of that right in
a derivative market.73 Restrictions on an intellectual property right may
therefore be enforced under Article 36 if the court finds that the holder of
that right has gone beyond the limited subject matter and has exercised
peripheral rights in a restrictive or arbitrarily discriminatory manner. 74 In
this way, the Court may concede a certain level of protection for property
rights granted by national governments while narrowly interpreting those
rights to prevent broad restriction on Community competition.
The CFI found that the broadcasters had attempted to exercise their
copyrights, not merely to protect the legitimate core functions of the rightsthose of protecting the moral right of the product and ensuring reward for
creative effort-but to "pursue an aim manifestly contrary to the aims of
Article 36."" In such a case, where the fundamental principles of freedom
72Court of First Instance, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, paras. 53, 54. Article 2 provides for the
"harmonious development of economic activities." EC TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 2.
Article 3(f) includes as a Community purpose the "institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the common market is not distorted." ma. at art. 3(f).
Myrick, supra note 13, at 103.
See Ben Smulders, European Community Competition Law and Licensing Agreements,
20 BROOK J. INT'L. L. 25, 27 (1993).
75 Court of First Instance, 1991 E.C.R. H-575, para. 56. The CH cites
the prior ECJ
cases of Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd. Case 235/87, 1988 E.C.R. 6211, 4 C.M.L.R. 122
(1989) and Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per Auto vei coli v. Regie
Nationale des Usines Renault Case 53/87, 1988 E.C.R. 6039, 4 C.M.L.R. 265 (1990)
(upholding refusal of car manufacturers to grant licenses to third parties to manufacture and
market spare parts as an exercise of the core subject matter of their intellectual property
right). The ECJ indicated in those cases that the exercise of an intellectual property right
outside of the proper subject matter of that right may be prohibited if it involves the abuse
of a dominant position in violation of Article 86. The ECJ cited examples of what it would
have considered to be violations of Article 86. Among those cited were arbitrary refusal to
supply independent repairers with spare parts and a decision by the manufacturer to cease
production of spare parts when many cars requiring those parts were still in use. The CH
likened the broadcasters' refusal to grant third parties the right to publish its program listings
with the arbitrary refusal of a manufacturer to supply spare parts to an independent repairer.
Additionally, the CF likened the broadcasters' failure to consider the needs of the consumer
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of competition and free movement of goods were at stake, the CH found
that Community law would prevail over national law in a manner inimical
to those principles.76
In the Magill case, the CR1 found that by withholding the right to publish
the weekly listings, the broadcasters were preventing a new product, a
comprehensive weekly TV guide, for which there was potential consumer
The CR affirmed that the true
demand, from entering the market."
motivation for this restriction was not the protection of the broadcasters'
legitimate copyright concerns in the integrity of the program listings, but
rather the procurement of a monopoly in the derivative market of weekly TV
listings for its own product.78
The CR further determined that, in ordering the broadcasters to supply
third parties with weekly listings, the Commission did not exceed the limits
of its power as granted by Article 3(1) of Regulation 17. 9 The CFI
referred to ECJ case law interpreting the Commission's power to end an
infringement to imply a "right to order such undertakings to take or refrain
from taking certain action" to bring about the end of the infringement.' 0
In their appeal to the CFI, the broadcasters asserted that, even if under
Article 3 of Regulation 17 the Commission was authorized to impose
compulsory licensing, they were prohibited from doing so under the
provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works. 81 The broadcasters asserted that since all of the Member States of
the Community are parties to the Convention, it must be considered to be a
part of Community Law under Article 234 of the EC Treaty.8 2 Article 9(1)
of the Convention was said to confer the exclusive right of reproducing a
in having access to a comprehensive weekly television guide to the halt in production of spare
parts for an automobile when there was still consumer demand for the parts. Based on these
comparisons, the CH concluded that the broadcasters' actions were not related to the core
subject matter of their copyrights. Id. para. 57.
76

Id. para. 56.

' Id. para. 58.
7

id.

79 Id. para. 71; see generally, supra note 60.
80Court of First Instance, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, para. 70 (citing Joined Cases 6 & 773,

Commercial Solvents v. EC Commission, 6 March 1974).
"' Id. para. 73.
2 Id. para. 73. The first paragraph of Article 234 states that "the rights and obligations
arising from agreements concluded before the entry into force of this Treaty between one or
more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not
be affected by the provisions of this Treaty." EC TREATY art. 234.
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protected work on the author, while Article 9(2) was asserted to allow only
national governments to compel licensing as long as it did not unreasonably
prejudice the author and was not in conflict with the ordinary exploitation
of the work. 3 The Commission asserted in its answer that the Berne
Convention did not apply because the Community itself was not a member
and that the ECJ had held that the EC Treaty took precedence over any
agreements concluded between Member States before the Treaty was
established."
The CFI agreed with the Commission that the Berne Convention did not
apply to modify their right to compel licensing in this case. The CH held
that Article 234 had consistently been interpreted as affecting only pre-Treaty
obligations between a Member State and a non-Member State and that
therefore, the Article could not be used in the relations between Member
States to justify inter-Community trade restrictions."
Additionally, the
Court established that Article 9(2) was never ratified by Ireland and was
ratified by the United Kingdom only after accession." The Court concluded that in the case of a post-accession ratification, a Member State may not
avoid the rules of the Treaty by concluding a convention or agreement. 7
The CR therefore upheld the decision of the Commission and its proposed
remedy and dismissed the appeal of the broadcasters.8 8
D. Advocate General
RTE and ITP appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance to the

83
84

87

Court of First Instance, 1991 E.C.R. H-575, para. 73.
I para. 74.
Id. para. 75.
Id. para. 76.

id.

Id para. 77. Leon Brittan, competition Commissioner for the EC, said in a written
statement following the Magill decision in the CFI, "There can no longer be any doubt that
the creation of a single market in which competition is undistorted cannot be held up by
abuse of dominant positions built on national rules.... Companies cannot unreasonably sit
on their intellectual property in order to stifle enterprise and prevent the emergence of new
forms of competition." EC Competition Law Held Supreme Over Member State Copyright
Law, 1992 - The External Impact of European Unification, July 26, 1991, at Vol. 3, No. 9
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Irecas File.
8
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Court of Justice. 9 The ECJ is assisted by Advocates-General who provide
the Court with independent and impartial recommendations on cases pending
The recommendations of the Advocatebefore the Court of Justice.'
General are advisory and as such are not legally binding but often have a
significant impact on the Court.9 The case was presented to Danish
Advocate General Claus Gulmann for his review and recommendation prior
to its hearing before the Court of Justice. 92 The broadcasters presented
several arguments for overturning the CFI's decision, most significantly that
the CFI had misinterpreted the concept of abuse of a dominant position
under Article 86 of the EC Treaty. 93 The Advocate General agreed with
the broadcasters on that argument and recommended that the Court of Justice
set aside the prior ruling by the CFI.9
According to the Advocate General's opinion, the CH erroneously
concluded that the actions of the broadcasters in restricting the licensing of
their program listings was an abuse of a dominant position under Article
86. 95 Gulmann stated that the anti-competitive nature of the exercise of the
copyright does not automatically qualify it as an abuse. 9 6 The exclusive
right to reproduce protected works, including the right to refuse to license,
is considered to be an integral part of the subject matter of a copyright.97
The key question Gulmann considered is whether there may be special
circumstances under which actions within the subject matter of a copyright

9 Smulders, supra note 74, at 48 n.61. RTE and ITP were joined in the appeal by
Intellectual Property Owners, a Washington based lobby group. Robert Rice, Business and
the Law: TV Listings Saga Lives On, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1993, at 14, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. The BBC did not participate in the appeal. EU Court Rejects
Appeal Against Irish TV Guide Ruling, AFX NEWS, April 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
0 EC TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 166.
9' Myrick, supra note 13, at 90.
92 BNA Report, supra note 21, at 1.
93 Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2 para. 18.
94 BNA Report, supra note 21, at 1; The Advocate-General recommended that the
broadcasters' costs in the CH and the Court of Justice be borne by the Commission and the
costs related to intervention be borne by Magill. EU: Copyright Can Protect TV Listings,
Says Top Court Official, EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESS RELEASES, June 1, 1994, available
in WESTLAW, Int-News-C Database.
95 BNA Report, supra note 21, at 2.
96 Id. at 2.
97 Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2, paras. 34, 38.
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might be considered an abuse.98 He states that it "is only where an exercise
[of a given intellectual property right] is not necessary in order to fulfill the
essential function that the interest of free movement of goods or the interest
of free competition must prevail over the interest of the owner of the right
to engage in that exercise." 99 Gulmann did not find sufficient evidence of
special circumstances beyond the essential function of the intellectual
property right which would merit labelling the broadcasters' refusal to
license an abuse under Article 86.
Gulmann did not consider the broadcasters' prevention of the emergence
of a new product on the market for which there was potential demand to be
a special circumstance. Gulmann asserted that the objective of a copyright
is to allow the copyright holder in a dominant position to restrict existing or
emerging enterprises from competing with his product."° He argued that
abuse exists when a copyright holder attempts to prevent a non-competing
product, which had the potential to meet a need not being provided by the
copyright holder, from entering the market.' ' The Advocate General
suggested that even in cases where a competing product might be superior
to the one offered by the copyright holder, consumer interests should not be
the basis of interference in the privileges surrounding the subject matter of
the copyright." 2
Gulmann likewise asserted that the exploitation of a copyright on a
derivative market can be regarded as necessary to fulfill the essential
copyright function of obtaining reward for creative effort.10 3 Therefore, the
broadcasters' control of the derivative market of weekly television listings
is not a special circumstance outside of the subject matter of the copyright.
The Advocate General stated that because he saw no special circumstances
warranting consideration as an abuse of a dominant position under Article
86, the consideration of whether the broadcasters were justified in refusing
to license was not relevant °4 However, Gulmann stated that should the
ECJ find such an abuse to exist under Article 86, he agreed with the CFI that
the refusal to license was not justified by the broadcasters' claim of needing

" Id. para. 40.
9 Id. para. 80.
'00 Id.para. 67.
'0' Id. para. 96.
102 1&L
para. 97.
103 Id. para. 112.
'0oId. para. 129.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 25:681

to ensure comprehensive, high-quality coverage. °5
In considering the effect of the Berne Convention on the Commission's
decision, the Advocate General suggested that the Convention, since it was
not in conflict with the EC Treaty, need not be excluded from consideration
but instead could be used to interpret the meaning of Article 86 and Article
3 of Regulation 17. ° Gulmann took into consideration the broad international support given to the Convention based on unanimous Member State
accession to the Convention and a 1992 European Council resolution under
national legislation
which the Member States would endeavor to introduce
10 7
in compliance with the provisions of the Convention.
Viewing Article 86 and Article 3 in light of the Berne Convention,
Gulmann concludes that even when the listings are given the minimum
protection provided by the Convention, Article 9(2) cannot be interpreted as
an exclusive state provision restricting the Commission from imposing
compulsory licenses.'0

Gulmann cautioned that the imposition of compulsory licensing might
reduce the value of a copyright to the mere collection of economic
dividends." 9 On this basis, he suggested that in order for the refusal to
grant a license to third parties to be considered outside of the core subject
matter of the copyright, especially substantial and weighty grounds within
competition law must be established." 0
E. European Court of Justice
The recommendation of the Advocate General, which seemed to establish
national copyright as a defense against EC competition law in all but

Id. para. 133.
Id. para. 153.
'0' Id para. 156. The Advocate General also cited Joined Cases 55 and 57/80, MusikVertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 ECR 147, which relied on the Convention, and to
the fact that the ECJ has previously held that Treaty rules could be interpreted in light of
other widely adopted conventions such as the European Human Rights Convention. Id para.
154 n.81.
'08Id. paras. 161, 166. Article 9(2) states that "it shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author." Id para. 162.
109 Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2, para. 87.
'5
0

' 6

110Id
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extreme cases of abuse, then passed to the Court of Justice for a final
judgment."' As stated previously, the Advocate General's opinion was
merely advisory and the Court had the option of either accepting or rejecting
Gulmann's recommendations." 2 In April, 1995, the Court of Justice
declined to accept Gulmann's reasoning and ruled in favor of the Court of
First Instance's confirmation of the Commission's opinion.
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the broadcasters were in a
dominant position. The Court affirmed the CFI's rationale that the
broadcasters, in having a de facto monopoly over the information used to
compile the listings, could effectively prevent competition in the market
for
3
weekly television guides and were therefore in a dominant position."
In establishing the broadcasters' abuse of that position, the Court reiterated
some of the fundamental principles enumerated by both the lower courts and
the Advocate General. The Court admitted that in the absence of Community harmonization or standardization of laws, protection of an intellectual
property right is a matter for national laws." 4 Additionally, the Court
reaffirmed that the exclusive right of reproduction is part of the author's
rights and therefore the refusal to grant a license, even for a dominant
undertaking, will not in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position." 5
However, the Court cited to the same precedent to show that under
exceptional circumstances, a particular exercise within the subject matter of
an intellectual property right may be considered abusive conduct." 6
The Court found three grounds for finding the broadcasters' conduct in
refusing to license the listings to be abusive. First, the Court agreed with the
CFI that there was no substitute for the comprehensive weekly TV guide
proposed by Magill." 7 Therefore, the Court found that the broadcasters'
actions in refusing to license prevented the emergence of a new product
which was not being offered by the broadcasters and for which there existed

1' Michael Foley, Republic of Ireland: TV Firms Can Prevent Listings Publication,
European Court Told, IRISH TIMEs, June 2, 1994, at 2, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Txtwe File.
.1.
See supra note 91.
' Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE), v. Commission, 1995
E.C.R. 416, at para. 47.
"4 Id. para. 49.
"' Id. para. 49.
116Id. para. 50.
"' Id. para. 52.
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potential consumer demand."1
Second, the Court agreed with the reasoning of the CH and the qualified
reasoning of the Advocate General and found no justification for the
broadcasters refusal to license on the basis of quality control arguments.1 1 9
Third, the Court upheld the CFI's determination that the broadcasters
reserved to themselves the derivative market of weekly television magazines
by denying access to information essential to the production of such
publications."n The Court agreed with both the CR and the Advocate
General in finding that the actions of the broadcasters satisfied the Article 86
requirement of having an effect on trade between Member States. 21 The
Court cited to prior cases establishing that a substantial effect on trade is not
necessary if it can be established that the conduct complained of is capable
of having such an effect."
Without discussion of the Advocate General's analysis of the use of the
Berne Convention in interpreting the Treaty, the ECJ rejected the broadcasters' appeal that imposition of compulsory licenses was incompatible with
Convention provisions recognized in Community Law.I 23 The ECJ cited
to settled case law establishing that the provisions of pre-accession
agreements cannot be relied on in intra-Community relations where the rights
of countries outside the Community are not involved." u
The Court upheld both the CR and the Advocate General in affirming that
the Commission properly met the requirements of Article 190 in providing
adequate reasoning for its judgment.125 The Court cited the CF's findings
that the Commission had clearly stated that the broadcasters went beyond the
actual substance of their copyrights and committed an abuse under Article
86 and that the Commission's statement of reasons was sufficient to provide
the main criteria on which the findings were based and would allow the
Court to carry out a review of the decision.'2

11 Id.

para. 54.

Id. para. 55.
para. 56.
para. 71.
" Id. para. 69.
123 Id. para. 86.
" Id. para. 84 (citing Case 286/86 Ministere Public v. Deserbais, 1988 E.C.R. 4907, para.
"9

'2 Id.
121Id.

18).
125Id.
12

para. 95.
Id. para. 100.
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V. ANALYSIS

Since the case began, RTE, BBC and ITP have all established the practice
of granting licenses for the publication of comprehensive TV listings, and all
three broadcasters' guides have become comprehensive weekly guides."z
Nonetheless, the controversy remains significant for its implications for the
development of intellectual property rights within the EC and the uncertainty
of the future relationship between national and EC competition law.
The position forwarded by the Advocate General was supported by the
character and purpose of an intellectual property right. The essence of an
intellectual property right is the sole and exclusive right to control a
particular product. The promise of the financial and creative satisfaction that
comes from the dominant position accompanying such a right encourages
research and development, creativity and innovation. The ECJ appeared to
find that the copyright holder's right to use its product to generate exclusive
financial rewards is satisfied by the reasonable return from a compulsory
license."2 However, a creator faced with the likelihood of compulsory
product licensing is potentially less likely to apply the time and effort needed
for real ingenuity.29 In such a situation, the very essence of the intellectual property right has been appropriated. 30
In the Magill case, it could be said that the Court prohibited the broadcasters from doing exactly what their copyright under national law gave them the
right to do: exclude third parties from using the copyrighted material in their
own products.13
Arguably, the market for program guides was not a
derivative market at all. The nature of a copyright provides that the same
right that protected the listings also protects the listing in any form of
reproduction.13 '
The ECJ artificially distinguished between the core
subject matter of an intellectual property right and the ability to exercise that

'27

Foley, supra note 111, at 2; Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2, para. 10. The UK

Broadcasting Act of 1990 required broadcasters to license their copyrighted program schedules
to other publishers. Rice, supra note 89, at 14. The Irish Legislation has not been amended.
Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2 para. 10.
'2 Reindl, supra note 15, at 73.
'29 Myrick, supra note 13, at 116.

130 Rosa Greaves, Symposium: Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Changing
Views in the European Community and the United States of America - Commentary, 20

BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 121, 125 (1993).
131Myrick, supra note 13, at 109.
132 Reindl, supra note 15, at 77.

700

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 25:681

right in derivative markets. 3 By restricting the ability of the broadcasters
to refuse to license to the detriment of any product that could be considered
downstream and dependent on the copyrighted material, the Court's
judgment restricted the broadcasters from withholding their licenses from a
producer intending to use that material to create a product which, while
slightly different than the subject matter of the copyright, is in fact in direct
competition with the holder of the copyright.' 34 Based on the Court's
findings, it is difficult to see when the broadcasters could have restricted the
use of their copyrighted listings, since anyone seeking a license would have
needed to use the listings in some "downstream" venture. If the broadcasters
had the power to exclude no one, then their copyright would be meaningless
and their incentive to supply the product would be diminished by the
potential decline in revenue. 135 As the Advocate General suggested, the
Court might logically have required the broadcasters to license a noncompeting product which was dependent on the broadcasters' information,
since that situation would not deprive the broadcasters of the benefits of their
creativity.)3
As has been suggested by many legal scholars as well as the Advocate
General, the decision of the ECJ is not readily reconcilable with European
case law indicating that the exercise of a copyright is not in itself an abuse
of a dominant position.' 37 The distinction between the Magill case and
cases such as Volvo and Renault3 l seems strained to fit a particular policy
argument. No clear argument can conclusively distinguish Magill from cases
where the mere exercise of an intellectual property right was held not to be
an abuse. 139 The CFI's argument that the broadcasters' refusal to supply
Magill with the listings was similar to a manufacturer's refusal to supply an
independent dealer with spare parts is distinguishable because the broadcasters were not extending themselves into a derivative market where their
product did not enjoy the protected status of the intellectual property

13

Corbet, supra note 8, at 354.

134 Myrick, supra note 13, at 116.
3 Id. at 117.
136

137

Id.; BNA Report, supra note 21.
Smulders, supra note 74, at 40-41 (The author cites Professor Michael Waelbroeck's

Annual Review of EEC Competition Cases 1989-1991 in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 111,

126 (1992)); see cases cited supra note 75.
13s See supra note 75.
139 Reindl, supra note 15, at 72.
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right."
The analogy to the refusal to supply parts for which a significant
demand exists is distinguishable by the assertion that the broadcasters fully
intended to supply the consumer demand for the information and were
merely excluding a potential competitor from doing the same. 4" Since the
essence of the copyright is the right to exclude others from reproducing
protected work, it is difficult to see how the refusal to allow even downstream producers to reproduce such work can constitute an abuse. 4 2 The
CFI seemed more concerned with the interest of the consumer in having
access to information than the interest of the copyright holder in the
protection of its property interest. 4 3 As stated by the Advocate General,
the interests of the consumer should not be used to justify an intrusion on the
substance of a copyright.'
The CFI's decision further appears to have used Article 86 to override
national copyright laws in an area which was reserved to national legislation
by Article 222 of the EC Treaty. 45 In other words, even though the case
law of the ECJ in competition cases established a "core bundle" of rights by
which, based on the provisions of the EC Treaty itself, national laws had the
power to protect in the absence of Community laws or harmonization, the
CFI seemed to use Article 86 to establish a discretionary power to define
what that "core bundle" of rights is and by doing so, circumvent the
protection of Article 222."

Id. at 74-5.
Id. at 75.
142 Smulders, supra note 74, at 41.
143 Corbet, supra note 8, at 354.
14 Gulmann Opinion, supra note 2, para. 97.
145 Perkins, supra note 22, at 298; Article 222 states that the, "Treaty shall
in no way
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership." EC
TREATY, supra note 5, at art. 222.
14 Myrick, supra note 13, at 115. It is thought by some that the appropriation of the
intellectual property right might violate the European Convention on Human Rights' general
principle of respect for property. Nicholas Green, Intellectual Property and the Abuse of
Dominant Position Under European Union Law: Existence, Exercise and the Evaporationof
Rights, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 141, 152 (1993). Article one of the first protocol to the
'40
141

Convention indicates that property rights may only be restricted by a state where necessary
for the promotion of the general interest. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. Though the
Community itself is not a party to the Convention, it has pledged to respect the fundamental
rights guaranteed in the Convention through a provision in the Treaty on European Union.
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 64, art. F. See also Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-
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Despite the ECJ's ruling that the Commission satisfied the provisions of
Article 190 by sufficiently stating the basis of its decision, the ECJ failed to
reference any rights held by the broadcasters in relation to its listings whose
legitimate exercise would be beyond the reach of Community law restrictions
and would not be considered an abuse. 47 Nor did it provide any guidelines for exactly what exercise of a nationally protected intellectual property
right would be considered to be an abuse by the EC courts and what exercise
would be permissible."' The use of discretion by the ECJ in determining
exactly what constitutes the specific subject matter of an intellectual property
right leaves the exercise of these rights lacking in guidance and stability and
leaves the owners of these rights fearful of compulsory licensing at any time
the Commission deems an exercise to be in conflict with EC competition
policies." 9
This uncertainty has spilled over into other areas of intellectual property
law and has sparked concern over the possible extension of the decision to
other areas where intellectual property rights are used to prevent the
emergence of competing products."5 Many copyright holders fear that the
EC competition laws will be used to force them to license billions of dollars
worth of technology or proprietary information in critically competitive areas
such as software and telecommunications.' 5 ' The Court's emphasis on the
dependence of the downstream market concerns the producers of strictly
utilitarian and functional products, such as computer programs, who almost
inevitably create such a dependence.15 2 A lobbying group including
General Electric, IBM and Digital Equipment intervened in the appeal to the
ECJ to try to ensure that the mere exercise of an intellectual property right
would not constitute an abuse of a dominant position and provoke compulso15
ry licensing. 1

Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727.
147 Myrick, supra note 13, at 114.
"' Toni Mack, USA: Foot in the Door - Patented Technology, FORBES, Sept. 13, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Txtlne Library, Txtlne File.
149 Rice, supra note 89, at 14.
"o Id at 14; Thomas C. Vinje, Recent Developments in EuropeanIntellectual Property
Law: How Will They Affect You and When?, 13 J.L. & COM. 301, 325, (1994).
15' Mack, supra note 148.
152 Smulders, supra note 74, at 42-43.
153 Mack, supra note 148. The general counsel for GE's patent licensing division felt that
the CFI's decision was an "ominous precedent" indicating the potential for expanding
compulsory licensing to include the patenting of technical equipment such as radar devices
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The recommendation of the Advocate General would have established the
need for substantial abusive interference with competition by the holder of
a national copyright to justify subordinating that right to EC competition
rules. 3" His opinion would have placed tight restrictions on the issuance
of compulsory licenses as a threat to the fundamental nature of intellectual
property rights. 55
Support for the ECJ's opinion naturally comes from the organs of the EC
itself, which viewed the decision of the CFI as a vehicle for eliminating the
distortions in competition created by national intellectual property laws." 6
The goal of the Commission was to undermine anti-competitive practices by
a uniform practice of forcing those copyright holders in a dominant market
position to license their products.15 7 The advancement of a stable single
market would be impeded by the preeminence of differing national
intellectual property laws with the potential to allow trade barriers and
pockets of anti-competitive behavior. 158 The decision could have a marked
impact in forcing monopolists to provide
access to intellectual property vital
59
market.
given
a
in
entrants
new
for
Article 86 strives to eliminate abuse which would limit "production,
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers."" The
compulsory licensing of certain technological patents would facilitate the
advancement of Community-wide development in the high-tech industry.
Since the CFI acknowledged that royalties and qualitative restrictions would
be proper in the copyright scenario, the holders of the copyright would see
a certain, if limited, amount of financial gain while the Community would
6
benefit from the dissemination of the product information.' '
The decision also potentially opens the door to greater and fairer access
to the dissemination of information on the information superhighway, much

and medical scanners. Id.
154BNA Report, supra note 21.
155Id.

'56
Competition Law: AG Suggests Overturning Landmark Competition, Copyright Rulings,
EUROWATCH, June 13, 1994, Vol. 6, No. 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
157BNA Report, supra note 21.
"' Corbet, supra note 8, at 363.
"9 New Legal Tool Could Help Push TPA, EC ENERGY MoNTHLY, May 16, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
'" EC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 86(b).
161Law, supra note 6, at 355.
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to the benefit of consumers. 62 The fear was that if the broadcasters'
protectionist argument was upheld, software producers in a position to
control access to information networks could assert the same argument."
The ECJ's ruling might be used to prevent dominant creators of computer
systems from limiting, through their control over operating system interfaces,
the creation of compatible application programs or peripheral equipment.'64
VI. CONCLUSION

The scope of the Magill decision might inevitably be limited due to the
The case concerned factual listings
particular information involved."
information considered to have little artistic or creative merit, and the
statutory monopolies granted to the broadcasters perhaps heightened their
responsibility to the viewing public."s Additionally, the case implicates
the Community's commitment to "television sans frontieres" 67 under
Article 59 of the EC Treaty.'
Nevertheless, intellectual property owners
will not rest easy until more mainstream actions are brought before the Court
and its position on compulsory licensing can be more conclusively determined.
The Magill decision was very significantly dependent on the specific facts
of that case.'6 The decision of the Court fails to establish a bright line
rule for determination of what kind of exceptional circumstances would
allow EC competition rules to supersede intellectual property rights. 70 If
the EC wants to establish a stable and comprehensive Community wide
competition policy regarding intellectual property rights, case law under the
ECJ would seem to indicate that an official harmonization policy would be
appropriate to conclusively override the supremacy of national laws in this

'62 Charles Goldsmith, Ruling in TV Listing Case Says Antitrust Rules Can Take
Precedence, WALL ST. J., April 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
163 Court Upholds Magill Decision, REuTERs TExTLNE, April 6, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
164 European Court Says Competition Trumps Copyright, supra note 3.
1 Vinje, supra note 150, at 325.
1'66Myrick, supra note 13, at 120.
167This translates to "television without frontiers."
16g Court of First Instance, 1991 E.C.R. IU-575, para. 27.
'69European Court Says
170id

Competition Trumps Copyright, supra note 3.
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area.17 1 Until then, the only guidance as to the meaning of "special
circumstances" and the abuse of a dominant position for intellectual property
owners may come from the CFI's warning that "[w]here it is apparent that
a rightholder is exercising its rights in such ways or circumstances as in fact
to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to Article 86, the right-holder must
anticipate that its actions may be challenged on EC competition
grounds
172
before National or European Courts and/or the Commission."'

"',See supra note 69 and 114. A proposal for a harmonization directive for copyright
protection was established on March 23, 1992 and was amended on January 7, 1993. Rules
on moral rights were removed from the proposal and would remain under the regulation of
the member states. Corbet, supra note 8, at 363. Another example of harmonization
initiatives in the area is the draft regulation on block exemptions of patent licensing which
aims to combine existing block exemptions for agreements on know-how and patents and to
harmonize and simplify the rules governing these areas. PatentLicensing Block Exemption
Regulations Extended Again, EuROPEAN REPORT, Sept. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, ECNews File.
2
John Grayston, InternationalUpdate - the European Court of Justice's decision in the
Magill case, LAW Soc'Y's GUARDIAN GAZETTE, 25 May 1995, Vol 92, No. 20, at 41.

